ABSTRACT
This article examines systemic transformations in Europe in mid‑2026 as an integrated process driven by shifts in the global geopolitical landscape and internal crises of European societies. It analyzes the interconnection between the Trump administration’s revision of the “Anchorage understandings”, the energy shock triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the wave of government resignations across the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, and Serbia. The collapse of the transatlantic consensus is demonstrated to open pathways for pragmatic and conservative forces oriented toward national interests. These developments are interpreted through the framework of the “New Westphalia” concept as a return to core principles of sovereignty and multipolarity. The initial policy agenda of incoming administrations and long‑term economic and political consequences of the European reset are projected.
Keywords: geopolitics, Europe 2026, tectonic shift, New Westphalia, sovereignty, energy crisis, transatlantic relations, political cycle.
INTRODUCTION
By mid‑2026, the European continent has reached a bifurcation point — a moment when accumulated contradictions dismantle the previous system, opening pathways for alternative development trajectories. Over a relatively short period of less than six months, events have unfolded that collectively reshape Europe’s profile and its global standing: the United States’ retreat from preliminary understandings with Russia on the Ukraine settlement, the escalation of the Middle East crisis and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, serial government resignations, and a sharp surge in influence for opposition conservative forces.
Research objective: To demonstrate that these events are neither random nor isolated, but represent links in a unified chain of global order transformation. Research tasks:
1. Illustrate how the evolution of US foreign policy erodes the established reference points of European elites.
2. Assess the impact of the energy shock as a catalyst for domestic political crises.
3. Analyze realignment processes in key European states.
4. Identify general patterns and prospects for the formation of a new European sovereignty model.
5. Link regional developments to the global trend toward a multipolar world order.
The research methodology draws upon principles of systems analysis, scenario forecasting, and the conceptual framework of the “New Westphalia” [1, pp. 18–22]. The empirical base includes official government data, analytical center assessments, sociological surveys, and expert evaluations.
CHAPTER 1. THE GEOPOLITICAL TRIGGER: THE TURNING POINT IN US–EUROPE RELATIONS
1.1 The Anchorage Understandings and Their Revision
The August 2025 meeting between the leaders of Russia and the United States in Anchorage created an illusion of a potential exit from the prolonged Ukraine conflict. Preliminary understandings were reached, including recognition of realities along the contact line, discussion of territorial status, and partial unblocking of Russia’s sovereign assets [2, p. 45]. For European elites, this came as a shock: for a decade, the dominant paradigm had been unqualified support for Ukraine and the unity of the sanctions front.
By mid‑2026, the Donald Trump administration began demonstratively distancing itself from these understandings. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly stated that no legally binding agreements had been concluded in Anchorage, only preliminary exchanges of views [3, p. 12]. Trump himself, under pressure from domestic political factors and the stance of European partners, announced the possibility of revising key provisions, particularly regarding the status of Donbas.
This turn produced a dual outcome. On one hand, Washington attempted to raise the stakes in negotiations, compelling Moscow to make additional concessions. On the other hand, it finally disoriented European governments, which had built their strategies on the premise of an unwavering course toward confrontation with Russia under US leadership. European leaders — Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz, and subsequently Friedrich Merz, Donald Tusk — found themselves in a position where their long‑term calculations had lost their foundation [4, pp. 78–80].
1.2 The Impact of the G7 Summit in Évian‑les‑Bains
Trump’s turn was not spontaneous. At the “Group of Seven” summit in June 2026, European leaders undertook active efforts to correct the US position. Emmanuel Macron presented arguments regarding Russia’s unpreparedness for compromise, utilized data on Ukraine’s successes in long‑range strikes against infrastructure, and publicly accused Washington of preparing a separate deal [5, p. 31].
As a result, Trump did adjust his rhetoric toward greater rigidity — but this did not restore clarity. It became evident: the United States is prepared to rewrite the rules of engagement at any moment, guided exclusively by its own interests. The transatlantic alliance has lost its foundation — mutual trust and predictability. Europe realized that it is no longer an equal partner, but rather an instrument in Washington’s hands, one that may be sacrificed for tactical gain [6, p. 93].
This conclusion became the internal catalyst that undermined the legitimacy of those governments that had staked everything on unconditional loyalty to the United States. Authority lost its meaning when it could no longer ensure stability and the protection of national interests in an environment where the primary external partner pursued an unpredictable course.
CHAPTER 2. THE ENERGY SHOCK AS A CATALYST FOR DOMESTIC CRISES
2.1 The Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and its Economic Consequences
If geopolitical uncertainty undermined the foundations of strategic planning, the energy crisis delivered the blow that brought down the structures themselves. The escalation of the Middle East conflict led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran in June 2026 to block navigation through the Strait of Hormuz by mining the approaches [7, p. 5].
The consequences for Europe proved catastrophic. Approximately 20 per cent of global oil exports and over 15 per cent of liquefied natural gas transit the strait. The price of Brent crude exceeded $130 per barrel, while natural gas prices at European hubs rose more than 2.5‑fold within two weeks [8, p. 17]. The European Commission revised its economic growth forecast downward: instead of the projected 1.2 per cent expansion, a 2.1 per cent annual contraction was now anticipated.
Industrial sectors proved particularly vulnerable. In Germany, the Volkswagen Group announced the closure of three production facilities and the elimination of 45,000 jobs due to the uncompetitiveness of energy‑intensive manufacturing. In Italy and Spain, shutdowns affected metallurgy and chemical production. Rising energy costs reignited inflation, which again exceeded 8–9 per cent year‑on‑year [9, p. 29].
2.2 Social and Political Response
Economic hardship translated instantly into social discontent. For households, utility bills for electricity and heating began consuming 25–30 per cent of income, driving rising poverty rates. According to Eurostat data, the share of the population unable to cover basic utility costs rose to 19 per cent, up from 12 per cent at the beginning of the year [10, p. 41].
Against this backdrop, the policies of incumbent governments — continued assistance to Ukraine, maintenance of sanctions regimes, commitment to the “green transition” — came to be perceived as disconnected from reality and harmful. Slogans about solidarity and shared values ceased to resonate when livelihoods were at stake. Governments proved incapable of delivering rapid, effective measures: the entire management system had been calibrated to serve entirely different priorities.
Thus, the energy crisis not only compounded economic distress but also operated as a universal test of governing competence. It exposed structural defects within the European model: excessive dependence on raw material imports, bureaucratic decision‑making, and the detachment of elites from the interests of their citizens.
CHAPTER 3. REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES IN KEY STATES
3.1 United Kingdom: From Loyalty to Pragmatism
The government of Keir Starmer, which took office following the premierships of Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak, pursued a course of maximum alignment with the United States and a hardline stance toward Russia. It raised defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP, allocated substantial tranches of aid to Ukraine, and upheld all sanctions initiatives [11, p. 56]. Yet when Trump rewrote the rulebook, and energy prices struck at the economy, this course turned into a liability.
In June 2026, under pressure from mass protests and internal divisions within the Labour Party, Starmer tendered his resignation. He was succeeded by Andy Burnham, former Mayor of Manchester, known as the “King of the North” for his advocacy of industrial regions and criticism of the London establishment [12, p. 23]. The new administration immediately reoriented its priorities:
- Raised the Energy Profits Levy to 55 per cent, directing receipts into targeted household support funds.
- Introduced a mechanism decoupling electricity tariffs from natural gas prices, concluding long‑term fixed‑rate contracts with low‑carbon generators.
- Initiated reviews of North Sea drilling restrictions to expand domestic production capacity.
- Declared the necessity of independent dialogue with all parties to conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine.
Burnham openly entered into public polemics with Trump, refusing to align his agenda with US demands. This marked the first clear signal: the United Kingdom is returning to its traditional role as an autonomous global actor, rather than an auxiliary partner.
3.2 Germany: The Collapse of the Centre and the Rise of the Right
The cabinet led by Friedrich Merz, which succeeded the Scholz coalition, inherited an accumulation of unresolved challenges: high energy costs, deindustrialization, and social fragmentation. Attempts to push through unpopular reforms — raising the retirement age to 70, rationalizing social security provisions — triggered mass demonstrations. Government approval ratings fell to 13 per cent, an all‑time historical low [13, p. 38].
Against this backdrop, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) movement advanced rapidly. In eastern federal states, its electoral support reached 41 per cent, bringing the party within reach of forming the first regional administration with an absolute parliamentary majority. The AfD campaigned on a platform of national sovereignty: ending military aid to Ukraine, renegotiating EU membership terms, restoring domestic energy independence, and pursuing dialogue with Russia and Middle Eastern producers.
Efforts by ruling establishment circles to designate the AfD as an extremist organization and ban its activities foundered on judicial rulings and open expressions of support from the Trump administration. It became evident: a right‑wing policy turn in Germany was becoming inevitable. The political system simply ceased to exercise control functions as the population en masse withdrew its confidence from traditional parties [14, p. 67].
3.3 Poland and Serbia: Maneuvering at the Edge of Choice
In Poland, the cabinet of Donald Tusk faced profound systemic crisis. While defence expenditures were raised to $55 billion, social infrastructure and economic development fell into neglect. The budget deficit reached 271 billion zlotys, forcing tax increases and pension constraint measures. Negative assessments of the government’s performance were recorded among 54 per cent of citizens [15, p. 44].
The opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, supported by President Karol Nawrocki, actively exploited the situation. Although the party alone could not command a parliamentary majority, its prospective alliance with the radical Confederation bloc now claimed a viable path to power. Przemysław Czarnek was designated as the coalition’s candidate for prime minister, with an agenda focused on domestic renewal and pragmatic international relations.
Comparable dynamics unfolded in Serbia. Aleksandar Vučić, who for years had maintained a balancing act between the West, Russia, and China, announced his resignation from the presidency in order to stand for the premiership — the post holding executive authority. This represented a tactical manoeuvre designed to reset his political standing while retaining control, at a moment when room for strategic compromise had narrowed to a minimum [16, p. 29].
3.4 France and Italy: Exhaustion of Established Resources
In France, Emmanuel Macron, who had aspired to leadership of the European project, effectively lost domestic legitimacy. His parliamentary majority eroded, while economic strains and migration disputes fuelled recurring civil unrest. Establishment circles were already openly preparing for a policy transition, anticipating the accession of conservative figures such as Jordan Bardella, who had stated that national interests must take precedence over European solidarity [17, p. 51].
In contrast, Giorgia Meloni’s Italian administration moved to consolidate its position. The government fast‑tracked electoral reform introducing a majority bonus system for successful coalitions. This created the conditions for stable parliamentary control and protected the governing agenda from obstruction. Meloni demonstrated consistent pragmatism: maintaining dialogue with Brussels and Washington, while actively developing energy partnerships with North Africa and the Middle East to reduce national vulnerability [18, p. 73].
CHAPTER 4. THE NEW FRAMEWORK: LESSONS AND PROSPECTS
4.1 Economic Implications: Sovereignty Over Globalization
The 2026 crisis has validated a core conclusion: unqualified market openness and external dependency represent strategic vulnerability. Europe is now drawing lessons pointing toward economic sovereignty:
- Energy independence: A balanced resource mix integrating nuclear generation, natural gas, renewables, and domestic extraction. Abandonment of ideologically driven decarbonization programs that compromise supply security.
- Industrial reconstitution: Public underwriting of strategic sectors, reducing reliance on imported critical components and raw materials.
- Direct partnership: Preference for long‑term bilateral contracts over spot market transactions and intermediated supply chains, enhancing price stability and operational reliability [19, pp. 105–108].
Europe is entering an era of higher structural costs and prices — the necessary price for systemic resilience. Economic priorities are being recast to serve development and security objectives, rather than abstract ideological constructs.
4.2 Political Priorities: The Initial Agenda of Autumn 2026
The accession of new administrations will reshape the political landscape. Key policy directions can be projected:
Domestic Policy:
- Budget reorientation: Curtailment of external commitments and military programs unrelated to national requirements; resources redirected toward infrastructure, energy systems, and social protection.
- Border integrity: Comprehensive review of migration regimes, strengthened border controls, priority integration of established residents over new arrivals.
- Governance renewal: Simplification of regulatory frameworks, counter‑corruption measures, reduction of bureaucratic overhead, and withdrawal of unpopular fiscal measures placing disproportionate burdens on households.
Foreign Policy:
- Pragmatism over bloc alignment: Engagement with all global power centres calculated on the basis of national interest. Rejection of automatic confrontation with Russia, China, or Iran.
- Renegotiated US relations: Construction of reciprocal partnerships, where Europe offers cooperation in exchange for resource access and technology — rather than political compliance in exchange for security guarantees.
- European institutional reform: Demands for decentralization, reduced bureaucracy, and enhanced sovereign prerogatives for member states. The EU will evolve toward a community of cooperating nations rather than a supranational structure [20, pp. 132–135].
4.3 Global Dimensions: Within the Paradigm of the New Westphalia
European developments form part of the broader global transition toward multipolarity. The “New Westphalia” framework — the restoration of norms of sovereignty, juridical equality, and interest balancing — is becoming a tangible reality beyond Eurasia. Bloc discipline and ideological homogenization are giving way to flexible alignments based on economic and strategic imperatives.
Europe is ceasing to function as a uniform geopolitical field and is re‑emerging as a mosaic of autonomous actors, each pursuing distinct development trajectories. This creates new risks of fragmentation, but also opens pathways toward a more equitable and durable international order. The hegemonic model has exhausted its historical utility; the new order is being constructed through contradiction and crisis.
CONCLUSION
Mid‑2026 marks a definitive turning point in the modern history of Europe. The wave of government resignations, elite turnover, and foreign policy re‑calibration does not represent chaos — it is the systemic response to structural crisis. The geopolitical repositioning of the United States and the energy shock emanating from the Middle East have acted as catalysts, but the underlying causes lie in the fundamental mismatch between inherited governance models and the actual requirements of societies.
Ideologically driven transatlanticism is being superseded by the pragmatism of national sovereignty. New leaders — Andy Burnham in the United Kingdom, likely conservative administrations in Germany and Poland, and reformed cabinets elsewhere — will frame policy first and foremost around the interests of their own populations. Europe is returning to the political logic of sovereign states, a decisive step toward the formation of a stable multipolar world system.
The transition period will remain complex and conflicted. Yet one development is already clear: the era of pre‑determined alignments and external diktat has concluded. The future belongs to those entities capable of defining their own objectives and assuming responsibility for their destiny.
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